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Caste Based Discrimination: Evidence and Policy
*
 
Caste-based quotas in hiring have existed in the public sector in India for decades. Recently 
there has been debate about introducing similar quotas in private sector jobs. This paper 
uses an audit study to determine the extent of caste-based discrimination in the Indian 
private sector. On average low-caste applicants need to send 20 percent more resumes than 
high-caste applicants to get the same callback. Differences in callback which favor high-caste 
applicants are particularly large when hiring is done by male recruiters or by Hindu recruiters. 
This finding suggests that the differences in callback between high and low-caste applicants 
are not entirely due to statistical discrimination. High-caste applicants are also differentially 
favored by firms with a smaller scale of operations, while low-caste applicants are favored by 
firms with a larger scale of operations. This finding is consistent with taste-based theories of 
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society into hierarchical groups by birth, with the hierarchy being deﬁned on a purity
scale. The caste functions as a closed group whose members are restricted in their choice
of occupation and degree of social interaction in a manner that is reminiscent of European
Guilds in the Middle Ages.1 These restrictions have led to large socioeconomic diﬀeren-
tials between diﬀerent caste groups. Localized aﬃrmative action policies to improve the
welfare of low-caste individuals were introduced in the 1930s in individual states such as
Tamil Nadu, but nationwide introduction of aﬃrmative action did not occur until after
Indian independence in the 1940s. The Indian government initiated national aﬃrmative
action policies to improve the status and living conditions of low-caste groups (Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes) by introducing caste-based quotas in political representa-
tion, public sector jobs and education. The quotas were later extended to a larger number
of disadvantaged caste groups (Other Backward Castes). However, despite sixty years
of aﬃrmative action programs in India, the socioeconomic divide between high and low-
caste groups persists. Current debate centers on whether or not to introduce caste-based
quotas in the private sector which would mandate hiring of low-caste employees.2
This paper utilizes an audit study to determine the extent of caste-based discrimi-
nation in the hiring practices of businesses in the Indian private sector. The caste cate-
gorization conventions used by the Indian government for aﬃrmative action and welfare
programs are followed. The categorization scheme (in ascending hierarchical order) is:
the untouchable castes are categorized as Scheduled Castes (SC), backward tribes outside
the caste system as Scheduled Tribes (ST), disadvantaged castes which do not belong to
the untouchable castes as Other Backward Castes (OBC) and the residual category con-
sisting primarily of the high or forward castes as Other Castes. The SC, ST, and OBC
consist of the historically disadvantaged groups while the Other Castes consist of groups
which have historically been and, continue to be, in a strong socioeconomic position.
For instance, the 2004-05 median per capita consumer expenditure bracket (in Rupees),
1Freitas, 2007[15].
2See for instance ‘With Reservations’ in the Economist, 10/4/2007, ‘We have a few Reservations’ in
the Economist, 5/27/2006, Vol. 379 Issue 8479, p38-38 as well as ‘Caste and Cash’ in the Economist,
4/29/2006, Vol. 379 Issue 8475, p46-46.
1within urban areas of India, was [580,675] for the SC, [790,930] for the ST, [675,790] for
the OBC and [1100,1380] for the Other category.3
The economic impact of caste has been studied extensively.4 Some studies use micro
level datasets to analyze caste-based discrimination in urban settings of India. A study of
factory workers in Poona (Lambert, 1963[23]) ﬁnds evidence of substantial wage discrimi-
nation against workers belonging to backward caste groups. Others use data from cotton
mills in Bombay (Morris, 1965[31]) and for shoemakers in Agra (Lynch, 1965[27]) to ﬁnd
evidence of discrimination. Banerjee and Knight (1985)[6] use survey data to determine
wage and occupation discrimination for migrant workers in Delhi by using decomposition
techniques. They ﬁnd wage discrimination to be higher than occupation discrimination
and discrimination in formal sector jobs to be higher than discrimination in informal
sector jobs.
All of these studies collect data in non-experimental settings. Hence the disparities
they report in wages and occupation choice fail to control fully for diﬀerences in produc-
tivity and diﬀerences in preferences between high and low-caste workers. As a result,
they do not provide a direct test of the hypothesis that discrimination is present. The
resume-based audit study that I carry out uses an experimental design to document the
extent of caste-based discrimination in white collar, private sector jobs in the city of Chen-
nai. Given the design of the study (described in section two), diﬀerences in productivity
across high and low-caste workers which are observable to employers but not observable
to the researcher are eliminated, enabling a more direct test of discrimination to be car-
ried out. However diﬀerences in productivity across high and low-caste workers which
are unobservable to both the employer and the researcher are not eliminated. Therefore
the disparities in outcomes observed between high and low-caste workers might either be
the result of diﬀerences in productivity which are unobservable to both the employer and
the researcher (statistical discrimination), or the result of employer prejudice. Although
3Data from the NSS carried out in 2004-05 (61st Round).
4See for instance Akerlof (1976)[2] for a theoretical model of caste-based discrimination, Munshi and
Rozensweig[32] for a study of caste-based networks and the role of these networks in the workplace as
well as Banerjee and Somanathan (2006)[5] and Pande (2003)[34] for a study of the eﬀects of caste-based
quotas in political representation.
2the study does not provide a direct test of whether discrimination arises as a result of
statistical discrimination or employer prejudice, I will argue that the results suggest that
at least some of the discrimination observed is the result of prejudice against low-caste
applicants.
Job applications were made for entry level white collar jobs which were based in Chen-
nai and advertised on job search web sites between March and December of 2006. Two
resumes were sent for each job vacancy, one being randomly assigned a high-caste sound-
ing name and the other a low-caste sounding name. The resumes depicted applicants of
approximately the same level of productivity. On average, a high-caste applicant had to
send 6.2 resumes to get one callback while a low-caste applicant had to send 7.4 resumes
to get one callback, a diﬀerence of approximately 20 percent. The nature of the audit
study also allowed me to look at the variation in callback gaps associated with recruiter
and ﬁrm characteristics. The eﬀect of low caste on callback is negative for male recruiters
and for Hindu recruiters, but it is positive for female recruiters and for non-Hindu re-
cruiters. The eﬀect of low caste on callback is negative for ﬁrms with a larger scale of
operations (with multiple domestic oﬃces or with foreign oﬃces) but positive for ﬁrms
with a smaller scale of operations (without multiple domestic oﬃces or without foreign
oﬃces).
Caste-based aﬃrmative action policy has a long history in India. This paper does
not provide a conclusive argument for or against caste-based aﬃrmative action. It does
provide convincing evidence on whether or not there exists discrimination in the white
collar labor market within India. The existence of large scale discrimination would cer-
tainly strengthen the case for a caste-based aﬃrmative action quota. The study ﬁnds
that particular groups of recruiters and ﬁrms discriminate signiﬁcantly against low-caste
workers in comparison to high-caste workers.
The paper is organized as follows: the ﬁrst section gives information on the city of
Chennai in which the audit study was carried out including the caste aﬃliation and
employment of the city’s labor force. The second section gives details of the ﬁeldwork.
The third section provides the results from the audit study. The fourth section gives an
3interpretation of these results and their policy implications. The last section concludes.
I. Background
Chennai is located in the south of India, on the Coromandel Coast of the Bay of Bengal.
With a population in 2001 of 4.3 million5 it is one of the largest metropolitan cities in
India. It is also the capital of the state of Tamil Nadu and has served as an important
administrative and commercial center since the time of the British. According to the
2001 census, Chennai has a literacy rate of 85.3 percent and 1.5 million workers.
A. Caste Composition and Inequality
Hindus formed 85 percent of the urban population of Tamil Nadu in 2004-05.6 Of the
Hindus, 15.3 percent belong to the SC and ST while 76.4 percent belong to the OBC.
This leaves the high-castes in a small minority (at 8.3 percent). These proportions stand
in stark contrast to the overall urban Hindu population of India, of which 20.5 percent
was SC and ST and 36.9 percent OBC in 2004-05. Low-caste groups in Tamil Nadu
do relatively worse than the high-caste groups in terms of per capita consumption. The
median per capita consumer expenditure bracket (in Rupees), within the urban areas of
Tamil Nadu, was [580,675] for the SC, [675,790] for the ST, [790,930] for the OBC and
[1880,2540] for the Other category.
B. Labor Market Statistics by Caste Category
Tamil Nadu is among the most prosperous and urbanized states of the country; it does
better than the Indian average on every labor market measure. Tamil Nadu has a higher
labor force participation rate than the rest of the country. The labor force participation
rate for men in both Tamil Nadu and in India is higher than it is for women. For men,
there is not a large diﬀerence in the participation rates across the diﬀerent caste categories
5Census of India, 2001.
6All data in this section is taken from the NSS carried out in 2004-05 (61st Round), unless otherwise
stated.
4but among women the high caste other category has the lowest participation rates.
Figure 1: Labor Force Participation Rates
Unemployment rates (given in ﬁgure 2) are lower, respectively, in Tamil Nadu than
in India except for women from SC who face a higher unemployment rate in Tamil Nadu.
Overall there is greater employment in Tamil Nadu among both men and women.
Figure 2: Unemployment Rates
Figure 3 gives a breakdown of employment for diﬀerent caste categories across oc-
cupations.7 The data is for 2004 and aggregates across the entire South Indian region
(including the states of Andhra Pradesh, Kernataka and Kerala as well as Tamil Nadu).
7Data taken from the NES 2004.
5The ﬁgure shows that the low-caste groups (SC, ST, and OBC) slightly dominate the
high-caste groups among service workers and markedly dominate the high-caste groups
among skilled, semi skilled and unskilled workers and those working in agriculture. High-
caste groups slightly dominate the low-caste groups among administrative, managerial,
and clerical workers and markedly dominate the low-caste groups among professionals,
government oﬃcials, and businessmen/self-employed. In the occupations which form the
focus of the audit study, the diﬀerences between high and low-caste groups are not very
large (service and administrative jobs), therefore it is not a priori obvious if there is
discrimination present in hiring which sets a particular caste group at a disadvantage in
comparison to another for the kind of jobs in my sample.
Figure 3: Employment by Caste across Occupations
C. Employment and Industry
The main industries of Chennai have traditionally been automobile and automobile parts,
but since the late 1990s there has been a high growth in outsourced jobs from the West.
Industries such as software services, hardware manufacturing, customer services and call
centers have become increasingly important over the past decade.
6A detailed breakdown of employment by industry type for Chennai and all large
cities of India (those with a population greater than a million people) for 2004-05 is
given in ﬁgure 4. The ﬁgure indicates that workers in Chennai are employed primarily
in manufacturing, trade, transport, and services, which is no diﬀerent from other large
Indian cities. However relatively more workers are involved in services in Chennai than
in other large cities of India.
Figure 4: Industry in Chennai
Chennai is located in a region in which the lower caste groups outnumber the high-
castes by a large margin. The low-castes, particularly the low-caste women, have been
active participants in the labor market, with labor force participation rates which are
higher than the rest of the country. Currently Chennai has seen a boom in outsourced
jobs from the West; it has become a center of growth for a new kind of job and occupation.
Outsourced jobs in customer service and other white collar professions have provided jobs
to large numbers of workers. Are the new jobs providing an avenue for the lower castes
to improve their lot or not? The next sections describe in detail the audit study, the data
collection, and the results obtained.
7II. Fieldwork
Evidence of discrimination is generally obtained by using survey data to run regressions
of labor market outcomes on attributes of workers that correlate with productivity; dif-
ferences in the outcomes across diﬀerent groups is taken as evidence of discrimination.
However survey data does not include all correlates of productivity used by employers to
make hiring and wage decisions. This makes it possible that what is taken as discrimi-
nation is the diﬀerence in productivity across diﬀerent groups which is observable to the
employer but not to the researcher.8 There is also little survey data on hiring decisions
made by employers (as opposed to wage decisions) and measurement of discrimination in
hiring is diﬃcult to carry out. These problems have led researchers to rely on evidence
from either natural experiments9 or from audit studies.
Resume-based audits (known also as correspondence testing) involve sending resumes
of hypothetical workers to employers who have identical productivity but who vary in
the characteristic of interest (ethnicity, race or gender). The earliest resume-based audits
were carried out in the UK by Jowell and Prescott-Clark (1970)[22], McIntosh and Smith
(1974)[28], and Firth (1981, 1982)[11][12]. Riach and Rich (1991, 1995)[36][37] also carry
out a resume-based audit in Victoria, Australia. Recent examples of resume based audits
are Weichselbaumer (2003)[39] and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004)[8].
The resume-based audit study used to measure caste based discrimination was carried
out over a period of ten months between March 2006 and December 2006 in the city of
Chennai. The sample of ﬁrms was those which posted job vacancies online on job web
sites. These job vacancies were all located in Chennai and no ﬁrm was audited twice.
Job web sites are a new phenomenon and are used extensively for recruitment into white
collar jobs in India. The largest of such sites have as many as 20,000 recruiters and 9
million resume postings. The majority of jobs posted on the job web sites are in IT
related ﬁelds, call centers and customer services, marketing, management, and in human
resources.
8For a review of the literature on race diﬀerentials in the US see Altonji and Blank, 1999[3].
9Goldin and Rouse, 1996[16].
8Recruiters post job vacancies on the web site and applicants post resumes. The
recruiters can directly get in touch with applicants who have posted publicly available
resumes. The applicants can also be the ones to contact the recruiter in response to a
particular job vacancy posted by the recruiter. The method used in the study was that
the resume of the applicants were not made publicly available and applicants contacted
the recruiter in response to speciﬁc job vacancies. An additional feature introduced by the
main web site that was used in the study (accounting for 70 percent of the observations)
early in the data collection was that individual applicants who belonged to low-caste
groups could declare their caste status. Low-caste applicants in the study had their
status declared as low income OBC.10
Prior to carrying out the study, a list of low and high-caste names was constructed that
would easily convey caste aﬃliation. The conventions for Indian names vary across the
country. Distinctively high or low-caste Tamil names were used, with high-caste names
having Sanskrit roots and low-caste names having Tamil roots. For instance, names such
as Iyer or Iyengar belong exclusively to the high Brahmin castes. For each of the ﬁctitious
identities, an e-mail address was created that was carefully monitored over the course of
the audit study.
In order to carry out the audit study, a set of ﬁctitious resumes were needed which
were close enough to resumes of actual job seekers so as not to arouse suspicion on
the part of employers. Resumes of actual job seekers from cities other than Chennai
as posted on diﬀerent job web sites were used. All contact and identity information
about the individual applicants was removed from these resumes. Information from the
diﬀerent resumes was mixed so as to obtain a set of resumes which depicted applicants
of approximately the same productivity for a particular job category. All resumes for a
particular job category depicted applicants who had obtained the same degree and had
the same set of skills.
10After the audit study was completed the callback gaps were checked for heterogeneity across web
site used (since an important diﬀerence was whether or not low caste status had been declared). It was
found that there were no diﬀerences in the callback gap across the diﬀerent web sites but that the main
web site used had higher callback for all applicants than the other web sites, probably due to the higher
popularity of this web site among recruiting ﬁrms.
9Job search web sites were used to identify job vacancies to which the applications
could be sent; a variety of diﬀerent job search web sites were used for the purpose.
Once a particular employer and job vacancy advertisement were identiﬁed, two resumes
corresponding to the speciﬁcations of the vacancy were selected. If the vacancy speciﬁed
a gender preference (for instance a female for a front oﬃce/administration job) then
names of the speciﬁed gender only were used. The ﬁrst resume was equally likely to be
assigned a high-caste name or a low-caste name. Once the name assignment had been
made to the ﬁrst resume, the second resume was assigned a high-caste name if the ﬁrst
resume was assigned a low-caste name and a low-caste name if the ﬁrst resume had been
assigned a high-caste name. This forced half the resumes to be high-caste and half to
be low-caste, with each ﬁrm receiving one low-caste resume and one high-caste resume.
When assigning names to the two resumes, the name was also equally likely to be a male
name or a female name (unless the vacancy speciﬁed a gender preference). After the
name assignment was made, additional contact information was added to the resumes, a
proﬁle of the applicant created on the job web site and the resumes e-mailed in response
to the job vacancy. The two resumes were e-mailed within a few days of each other.
Callback by employers was measured by monitoring the e-mail addresses of ﬁctitious
applicants as well as by monitoring a number of telephone lines which had been obtained
for the purpose in India. When a call was made to the telephone lines, it was either taken
and the oﬀer of interview rejected or the number and time of the call noted (the telephone
numbers were matched with those given by the employer in the advertisement).
By the nature of its design, a resume-based audit eliminates productivity correlates
that are observable to the employer but which are not observable to the researcher. All
the productivity correlates which are used by the ﬁrm in making the callback decision are
contained in the resume which is sent in response to the job vacancy advertisement. This
is an important advantage for using data from an audit study instead of using survey data
to look at diﬀerential callback, since I can rule out diﬀerences in productivity correlates
observable to the ﬁrm but not to me as a cause of the diﬀerential callback. However it
is important to note that it is still possible that there are some productivity correlates
10used by the ﬁrm in making the callback decision which are unobservable to both the
ﬁrm and to me. For instance if the ﬁrm considers a good English accent an important
productivity correlate for customer services jobs and it infers from the high-caste name
that the individual is likely to have a good primary education and a good English accent,
then this is a productivity correlate which the ﬁrm uses in making the callback decision
but one which is not directly observable to either the ﬁrm or to me.
Another advantage of using the data from the present study is that the caste-speciﬁc
names were randomly assigned to the resumes. The same resumes were sometimes asso-
ciated with a high-caste name and at other times with a low-caste name. The random-
ization ensured that the low callback rates observed for low-caste applicants were not
simply due to the low-caste names being associated with low quality resumes but due to
their low-caste. However, since I do not vary the quality of the resumes being sent to the
same ﬁrm, the randomization step is not crucial for the interpretation of my results.
III. Results
The audit study was carried out between March, 2006 and December, 2006. A total
of 523 job vacancies in customer services and front oﬃce/administration were applied
to, and 1046 resumes were sent (two for each job). Job vacancies were selected from
diﬀerent online job search web sites and applications were made via e-mail. All jobs
were entry-level jobs and all respondents had an undergraduate degree in the same ﬁeld
(from colleges which were ranked the same in that ﬁeld of study) as well as ten to
twelve months of experience. The study did not vary the quality of resumes across the
applicants. This meant that although the two resumes used for a particular job vacancy
were not identical, they were nevertheless perfectly comparable in terms of education,
skills, and experience. Callback was measured via e-mail and through the telephone
numbers provided to recruiters.
The callback rate for high-caste applicants was 16.1 percent while the callback rate for
low-caste applicants was 13.6 percent, with a 20 percent higher chance that a high-caste
11applicant gets called back for an interview. In other words a high-caste applicant had
to respond on average to 6.2 job vacancies in order to get a single callback while the
low-caste applicant had to respond on average to 7.4 job vacancies in order to get a single
callback. The breakdown of resumes that were sent by job type and job web site used are
given in table 1. Job type is a category created to simplify the discussion of the results.
Applications were made to a variety of industries and occupations. For each of these
diﬀerent industries and occupations resumes were used that satisﬁed the speciﬁcations of
the industry and occupation. However, the job-type category was created because all of
the job vacancies could easily be put into a few well deﬁned groups. The job categories
used in the paper are customer services and front oﬃce/administration.
Table 1: Job types and web sites used in the study
Total Callback Rate
Number of resumes 1046[100%] 155[15%]
by Type:
customer service jobs 674[64%] 114[17%]




1 Other job web sites used in the study included Mon-
sterIndia, JobsAhead and Times of India.
2 % in column 2 are out of total number of resumes. Job
types and job web sites are mutually exclusive categories.
3 % in column 3 are out of number of resumes in a particular
category (as given in column 2).
Of the resumes, 64 percent were used to apply for jobs in customer services and the
remaining 36 percent for jobs in front oﬃce/administration. The response rate from ﬁrms
was 17 percent for resumes sent to customer services jobs and 22 percent for resumes sent
to front oﬃce/administration jobs. Four diﬀerent job web sites were used for the audit
study: Naukri, Monster India, JobsAhead, and the Times of India. The Naukri web site
was used for approximately 70 percent of the resumes that were sent while the other
three were used for the rest. All job vacancies posted in the designated job categories
were applied to during the time period in which the audit study was in progress. The
12main constraint in choosing job vacancies was the frequency with which new ﬁrms posted
vacancies. Naukri was used more often than any of the others due to the large number of
postings on it by diﬀerent ﬁrms, as it is the most popular job website in India at present.
Not only did it have the highest number of job postings but also the highest response
rates by the ﬁrms that were contacted (15 percent instead of the 13 percent response rate
by ﬁrms posting vacancies on other websites).
A. Symmetry of Treatment by Job Vacancy
In this section I carry out tests on the null hypothesis of symmetry in treatment by re-
cruiters for high and low caste applicants. Speciﬁcally, the tests determine whether the
number of applicant pairs in which the high caste applicant is favored is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the number of applicant pairs in which the low caste applicant is favored.
This is a weaker test than a test which tests for zero diﬀerences in callback but the advan-
tage of this test is that it allows for the possibility of race neutral chance or randomness
in hiring. Of the 523 job vacancies that were applied to in customer services and front
oﬃce/administration, there were 28 applicant pairs for which the low-caste applicant was
called back and the high-caste applicant was not, and 41 applicant pairs for which the
high-caste applicant was called back and the low-caste applicant was not (as given in
table 2). For 43 applicant pairs both the high and low-caste applicants received callback,
while for 411 applicant pairs neither of the applicants received callback. The symmetry
tests which are used in this paper are the likelihood ratio test and the conditional sign
test.11
For the likelihood ratio test the null hypothesis to be tested is that the number of job
vacancies (ﬁrms) in which the high-caste applicant is favored is equal to the number of
job vacancies (ﬁrms) in which the low-caste applicant is favored. Given that the outcomes
follow a multinomial distribution, the constrained and unconstrained likelihood may be
estimated and the chi square statistic estimated from these. It is then simple to use the
11A detailed discussion of the tests is found in Heckman and Siegelman (1992)[20] and Lehman
(1986)[24]. Monte Carlo simulations are given in Appendix 1 to check the size and power of the two
tests.
13chi square distribution (with a single degree of freedom) to determine whether to accept
the null hypothesis. Given the data available from the audit study, the likelihood ratio
test gives a p-value of 0.1168.
Another method to test for symmetry is to use the conditional sign test, which is
a small sample test. Conditional on just one applicant receiving callback suppose it is
recorded as a plus sign when a ﬁrm favors a high-caste applicant, the total number of plus
signs (say Y ) is then a binomial variable with a distribution b(p,n) where n is the number
of ﬁrms that respond to one applicant only and p is the probability that the high-caste
applicant is favored. Then the sign test will test the null hypothesis that p = 0.5 (or
there is symmetry in callback across caste) against the (one-sided) alternative p > 0.5.
The sign test gets rejected when |Y − 0.5n| is too large. Given the data from the audit
study the p-value is estimated as 0.0740.
Table 2: Symmetry of treatment between high and low-caste applicants
(High-Caste, Low-Caste)
(Received Callback, Received Callback) 43
(Received Callback, Did Not Receive Callback) 41
(Did Not Receive Callback, Received Callback) 28
(Did Not Receive Callback, Did Not Receive Callback) 411
Testing Symmetry: p- value
Likelihood Ratio Test 0.1168
Conditional Sign Test 0.0740
1 Null hypothesis being tested is that number of ﬁrms that favor high-caste
applicants are equal to number of ﬁrms that favor low-caste applicants.
I ﬁnd that high-caste applicants are more likely to receive callback than low-caste
applicants and the number of cases in which the high-caste applicants are favored is higher
than the number of cases in which the low-caste applicants are favored. The p-values
when running tests of symmetry between high and low-caste applicants are consistently
either close to 0.10 or less, indicating there is a case to be made for the presence of caste-
based discrimination. The next section gives the results when carrying out parametric
analysis on the aggregate data collected.
14B. Job Types and Gender Pairs
The binary outcome for applicant j who faces ﬁrm i is given as
yij = 1 if applicant receives callback
0 if applicant does not receive callback
for j = 1,2 applicants and i = 1,2,...N ﬁrms. Then the binary outcome yij follows
a Bernoulli distribution with parameter pij = P[yij = 1|xij,β,αi]. Assuming a probit
speciﬁcation for the parameter gives pij = P[yij = 1|xij,β,αi] = Φ(αi+xijβ) where Φ(.) is
the standard normal cdf, xij is the set of regressors for applicant j(including caste) when
facing ﬁrm i, and αi is the individual ﬁrm eﬀect.12 Of speciﬁc interest is determining the
eﬀect of a change in caste on the change in the probability of callback by the ﬁrm. Given
the nature of the audit study, the assignment of caste and other regressors is random
conditional on the ﬁrm (at least for ﬁrms that do not specify a gender requirement since
gender is also included as a regressor). Therefore for the subset of ﬁrms that do not specify
a gender requirement, the individual ﬁrm eﬀect may be treated as a random eﬀect which
is independent of the regressors. Assume that, together with the probit speciﬁcation,
the individual ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀects are normally distributed, αi ∼ N[0,σ2
α]. Then the
random eﬀects maximum likelihood estimate of β and σ2














random eﬀects probit speciﬁcation is carried out for the set of observations for which the
job vacancy did not specify a gender requirement.
Table 3 gives the characteristics of the resumes which were sent in response to hir-
ing ﬁrms, both in the complete sample and in the sub-sample on which the random
eﬀects probit was carried out. All resumes are pooled so that there are two resumes
for every hiring ﬁrm with a total of 1046 across the complete sample. There are more
women than men for the complete sample, with 55 percent of the complete sample of
applicants being female. As already mentioned, a large number of the job vacancies in
front oﬃce/administration requested a female, so that females form a higher proportion
12A linear probability speciﬁcation with ﬁxed eﬀects and robust standard errors on the entire sample
of applicants gave similar results.
15of applicants than do males. There are fewer resumes which apply for jobs in front of-
ﬁce/administration jobs. Again this is the result of the fact that most of the job vacancies
available on the job web sites were in customer services. In the sub-sample in which gen-
der assignment was random and on which the probit speciﬁcation was done, there are a
total 906 observations. In this sub-sample there are a higher proportion of resumes which
apply for jobs in customer services than in front oﬃce/administration in comparison to
the overall sample (69 percent instead of 64 percent).
Table 3: Sub-sample characteristics
Entire Sample Probit Sub-Sample
Applicant Gender Female 0.5507 0.4967
(0.4977) (0.5003)
Job type front oﬃce/admin 0.3556 0.3068
(0.4789) (0.4614)
N 1046 906
1 Columns 2 and 3 give the means of the variables. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
2 Probit sub-sample exludes observations for which gender assignment is non-random.
Table 4 gives the results from estimation of a probit model on the callback dummy
with random eﬀects at the ﬁrm level. In column (1), the regression result is reported
for when caste is the only regressor. The eﬀect of low-caste is a reduction by 0.19
in callback probability. In column (2) the regression result is reported when callback
probability is regressed on gender and caste of the applicant together with interactions of
applicant caste and gender. The eﬀect of low caste for a female applicant is a reduction
by 0.37 in callback probability. Being a male applicant also reduces callback, but at
0.01 the eﬀect is more than ten times smaller than it is for female applicants and the
reduction is not signiﬁcant. In column (3) the regression result is reported when callback
is regressed on interactions of job type and caste as well as interactions of job type and
caste. The eﬀect of low-caste in customer services is smaller than the eﬀect of low-
caste in front oﬃce/administration. Low-caste applicants have lower callback in both
customer services and in front oﬃce/administration jobs. Column (4) gives the full
speciﬁcation when callback is regressed on the interaction of caste, applicant gender and
job type. The eﬀect of low-caste on male applicants in both customer services and front
16oﬃce/administration jobs are small. In fact the eﬀect of being a low-caste male applicant
in customer services jobs is actually positive, but insigniﬁcant. The eﬀects of being a
low-caste applicant are stronger for female applicants. In particular female applicants
who are low-caste and who apply for jobs in front oﬃce/administration face signiﬁcantly
lower callback. The eﬀect of low-caste is large and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Table 4: Eﬀect of low-caste on callback




























Observations 906 906 906 906
1 LC is the dummy for Low Caste, FA for Female Applicant, MA for Male Applicant,
CS for Customer Services jobs, FOA for Front Oﬃce/Administration jobs.
2 The marginal eﬀect is for a discrete change in the variable X. Standard deviations
are given in parentheses.
3 The eﬀect of low caste is obtained by using a Probit speciﬁcation, controlling for job
vacancy level random eﬀects. Controls for applicant gender and job type are included.
4 ∗ Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level,∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level,∗∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 2.5
percent,∗∗∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
An important result that is obtained from carrying out the multivariate regression
analysis is that low-caste reduces callback for both male and female applicants and for
both customer services and front oﬃce/administration jobs. However the eﬀect of low-
caste on callback varies across both applicant gender and job type. The highest reductions
in callback due to low-caste are observed for female applicants who respond to jobs in
17front oﬃce/administration. While a very detailed disaggregation is aﬀected by the small
number of observations, it is important to note that there is no job type or gender
disaggregation in which low-caste is associated with higher callback. The next sections
examine the callback gaps between high and low-caste applicants when information on
recruiter and ﬁrm characteristics is incorporated in the analysis.
C. Recruiter Characteristics
Each employer advertisement for a job vacancy that was used in the study had the name
of the contact person in the ﬁrm. It was possible to ﬁnd some characteristics of the
recruiter by looking at the list of names that were compiled from these advertisements.
Names were available for 379 recruiters. The callback decision is probably made by these
individuals.
50 percent of the names were deﬁnitely male and 41 percent were deﬁnitely female.
About 74 percent of the names were typical Hindu names and 16 percent were deﬁnitely
not Hindu names (of which 55 percent were typical Christian names and 17 percent
were typical Muslim names). This provides some information regarding the sample of
recruiters who are making the hiring decision and were the subjects of the study.
In table 5 the callback gaps by caste and recruiter name characteristics are given.
There are heterogeneities in the callback gaps across the recruiter characteristics. The
ratio of number of cases in which high-caste applicants are favored to number of cases
in which low-caste applicants are favored is 2.1 for male recruiters and 1.5 for Hindu
recruiters. It is 0.9 for female recruiters and 0.4 for non-Hindu recruiters. Tests of
symmetry (the likelihood ratio and conditional sign tests) are performed on the diﬀerent
sub-samples with the results given in table 5. Tests of homogeneity (the one-sided Fisher
exact test) across recruiter characteristics are also carried out. The p-value for the test
across recruiter gender is 0.136 and the p-value across recruiter religion is 0.118.
The eﬀect of low-caste on callback across the diﬀerent recruiter characteristics can
also be obtained. Table 6 gives the characteristics for sub-samples for which recruiter
characteristics are available and for which the probit regressions are carried out.
18Table 5: Callback Gaps across Applicant Pairs by Recruiter Characteristics
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
(0,0) (1,0) (0,1) (1,1) (II)/(III) LR CS
Male Recruiters 149 17 8 17 2.1 0.07∗ 0.05∗∗
Female Recruiters 121 10 11 13 0.9 0.83 0.50
Hindu Recruiters 215 25 16 25 1.5 0.16 0.11
Non Hindu Recruiters 48 2 5 5 0.4 0.25 0.23
(High-Caste, Low-Caste) 295 30 22 32 1.3 0.27 0.17
1 LR is for Likelihood Ratio test, CS for Conditional Sign test.
2 (0,0) if neither applicant received callback, (1,0) if high caste applicant received callback, low
caste did not, (0,1) if low caste received callback high caste did not and (1,1) if both received
callback.
3 ∗ Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level,∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level,∗∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 2.5
percent,∗∗∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
Table 6: Sub-sample with recruiter characteristics





front oﬃce/admin 0.3774 0.3309
(0.4851) (0.4710)
Recruiter Characteristics
male recruiters 0.5692 0.5636
(0.4956) (0.4964)
Hindu recruiters 0.8208 0.8291
(0.3839) (0.3768)
N 636 550
1 Columns 2 and 3 give the means of the variables. Standard deviations are given in
parentheses.
2 Probit sub-sample exludes observations for which gender assignment is non-random.
Table 7 presents the estimation results from probit regressions with random eﬀects
at the ﬁrm level. Dummies for female applicants, job types and recruiter characteristics
are included in the speciﬁcations. Again, low-caste reduces callback, as given in column
(1). The eﬀect of low-caste on callback is low, at just 0.08. Column (2) shows the
eﬀects of low-caste on callback separately for male and female recruiters. The eﬀect of
low-caste on callback is negative for male recruiters but positive for female recruiters.
These eﬀects are larger than in column (1), with low-caste reducing callback by 0.34
for male recruiters and increasing callback by 0.22 for female recruiters. Column (3)
lists the eﬀects of low-caste on callback separately for Hindu and non-Hindu recruiters.
19The eﬀects of low-caste are negative for Hindu recruiters but positive for non-Hindu
recruiters. Again these eﬀects are larger in magnitude than those in column (1). For
Hindu recruiters low-caste reduces callback by 0.21 while for non-Hindu recruiters low-
caste actually increases callback by 0.62. Finally column (3) gives the eﬀects of low-
caste when recruiter gender and recruiter religion are interacted with low-caste. From
this speciﬁcation the largest eﬀects associated with low-caste are found among Hindu
recruiters who are male. Low-caste reduces callback by as much as 0.51 among this
group of recruiters, and this reduction in callback is statistically signiﬁcant. For all
other groups of recruiters the eﬀects are positive and the largest in magnitude for female
recruiters who are non-Hindus.
Table 7: Eﬀect of Low-Caste on Callback with Recruiter Characteristics




























Observations 550 550 550 550
1 LC is the dummy for Low Caste, MR for Male Recruiter, FR for Female Recruiter,
HR for Hindu Recruiter, NHR for non-Hindu Recruiter.
2 The marginal eﬀect is for a discrete change in the variable X. Standard deviations are
given in parentheses.
3 The eﬀect of low caste is obtained by using a Probit speciﬁcation, controlling for job
vacancy level random eﬀects. Controls for applicant gender and job type are included.
4 ∗ Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level,∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level,∗∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 2.5
percent,∗∗∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
20The diﬀerences in callback gaps across recruiter gender and religion are interesting be-
cause recruiter characteristics are seldom available for analysis in empirical studies. This
may potentially have implications for an interpretation of why discrimination arises in
the ﬁrst place. Heterogeneity in callback across recruiter characteristics such as recruiter
gender is more consistent with a taste based theory of discrimination rather than an
asymmetric information theory of discrimination. This paper suggests that inclusion of
recruiter characteristics is important to understand fully how discrimination gets played
out in the labor market.
D. Firm Characteristics
To analyze how the callback gaps varied by ﬁrm characteristics it was important to obtain
more information on ﬁrms that advertised for vacancies on job search web sites. In most
cases the ﬁrms that advertised for vacancies also included a web site address in the job
vacancy. Some of the job search web sites also had publicly available information on the
web site addresses of their clients. In short it was possible to ﬁnd the web sites of most
ﬁrms that were present in the sample (around 53 percent of the total). These web sites
had some information that may be used to determine the scale of operations of these
ﬁrms. The location information of the branch oﬃces for diﬀerent ﬁrms was a source of
information which was utilized in this regard. Using the web sites, it was found that 30
percent of these ﬁrms had oﬃces in foreign locations outside of India and that 44 percent
of the ﬁrms had oﬃces in more than one city within India. These measures were used as
ﬁrm characteristics to compare the callback gaps across the diﬀerent ﬁrms (serving as a
measure of large and small ﬁrms respectively).
Table 8 gives the callback gaps across caste and across ﬁrm characteristics. There is
substantial heterogeneity in callback gaps across the diﬀerent ﬁrm characteristics. High-
caste applicants are favored by ﬁrms without foreign oﬃces and without multiple domestic
oﬃces in a larger number of cases than are low-caste applicants favored. On the other
hand low-caste applicants are favored by ﬁrms with foreign oﬃces and with multiple
domestic oﬃces in a larger number of cases than are high-caste applicants favored.
21The callback gaps (ratios) vary from 1.8 for ﬁrms without multiple domestic oﬃces
to 0.8 for ﬁrms with multiple domestic oﬃces and 2.1 for ﬁrms without foreign oﬃces
to 0.6 for ﬁrms with foreign oﬃces. When data is disaggregated by ﬁrm characteristics
the symmetry tests reject the null hypothesis of symmetry for ﬁrms without multiple
domestic oﬃces and without foreign oﬃces. These ﬁrms signiﬁcantly favor the high-caste
applicants in more cases than they favor the low-caste applicants. Firms with multiple
domestic oﬃces and foreign oﬃces favor low-caste applicants over high-caste applicants.
Tests of homogeneity of callbacks across ﬁrm characteristics (the one-sided Fisher exact
test) give a p-value of 0.057 when the test is carried out for homogeneity in callback across
ﬁrms with and without foreign oﬃces. The p-value is 0.154 when the test is carried out
for homogeneity of callback across ﬁrms with and without multiple domestic oﬃces.
Table 8: Callback Gaps across Applicant Pairs by Firm Characteristics
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
(0,0) (1,0) (0,1) (1,1) (II)/(III) LR CS
Firms with FO 68 4 7 6 0.6 0.36 0.27
Firms without FO 145 21 10 19 2.1 0.05∗∗ 0.04∗∗
Firms with MDO 106 5 6 7 0.8 0.76 0.50
Firms without MDO 106 20 11 18 1.8 0.10∗ 0.07∗
(High-Caste, Low-Caste) 213 25 17 25 1.5 0.22 0.14
1 FO is for Foreign Oﬃces, MDO is for Multiple Domestic Oﬃces.
2 LR is for Likelihood Ratio test, CS for Conditional Sign test.
3 (0,0) if neither applicant received callback, (1,0) if high caste applicant received callback, low
caste did not, (0,1) if low caste received callback high caste did not and (1,1) if both received
callback.
4 ∗ Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level,∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level,∗∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 2.5
percent,∗∗∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
Parametric analysis of the callback dummy is carried out with the introduction of
ﬁrm characteristics along the same lines as the previous two sections. Instead of recruiter
characteristics, ﬁrm characteristics are added to the set of regressors. The sub-sample for
which ﬁrm characteristics are available is of 279 ﬁrms and 558 applicants. The sub-sample
in which the gender assignment was non-random (and on which the probit speciﬁcation
is run) consists of 478 observations.
Table 10 presents the estimation results from running a random eﬀects probit regres-
sion. The regression is run for the sub-sample of applicants who apply to ﬁrms for which
22Table 9: Sub-sample with ﬁrm characteristics





front oﬃce/admin 0.3620 0.3096
(0.4810) (0.4628)
Firm Characteristics
Firms with MDO 0.4444 0.4435
(0.4973) (0.4973)
Firms with FO 0.3011 0.3264
(0.4591) (0.4694)
N 558 478
1 MDO is for Multiple Domestic Oﬃces, FO is for Foreign Oﬃces.
2 Columns 2 and 3 give the means of the variables. Standard deviations are
given in parentheses.
3 Probit sub-sample exludes observations for which gender assignment is non-
random.
the ﬁrm characteristics are available and for which gender assignment is random. In
column (1) the eﬀect of low-caste is given for the sub-sample of resumes for which ﬁrm
characteristics are available. Low-caste reduces callback by 0.12. Column (2) gives the
eﬀects of low-caste on callback among ﬁrms with and without multiple domestic oﬃces.
In the sub-sample for which the probit is carried out the eﬀect of low-caste on callback is
negative for ﬁrms without multiple domestic oﬃces but positive for ﬁrms with multiple
domestic oﬃces. The magnitudes for these eﬀects are larger than in column (1). For
ﬁrms with multiple domestic oﬃces, low-caste increases callback by 0.47, but for ﬁrms
without multiple domestic oﬃces low-caste reduces callback by 0.36. Column (3) gives
the eﬀects of low-caste on callback among ﬁrms with and without a foreign oﬃce. Again
the eﬀects of low-caste are stronger in these groups than they were overall in column (1).
Low-caste increases callback for ﬁrms with foreign oﬃces by 0.42 but it reduces callback
for ﬁrms without foreign oﬃces by 0.37. Column (4) gives the eﬀects when low-caste is
interacted with both the presence of multiple domestic and foreign oﬃces. In this speci-
ﬁcation, low-caste increases callback for ﬁrms which have both multiple domestic oﬃces
and foreign oﬃces and this increase in callback is statistically signiﬁcant. For all other
ﬁrm types low-caste reduces callback, with the largest reductions in callback occurring
23among ﬁrms without multiple domestic oﬃces and without a foreign oﬃce.
Table 10: Eﬀect of Low-Caste on Callback with Firm Characteristics




















LC×w MDO×w FO 1.0565∗∗
(0.4893)
LC×w MDO×w/o FO -0.1696
(0.5179)
LC×w/o MDO×w FO -0.1283
(0.4546)
LC×w/o MDO×w/o FO -0.4277
(0.2624)
Observations 478 478 478 478
1 LC is the dummy for Low Caste, MDO is for Multiple Domestic Oﬃces, FO is for Foreign Oﬃces.
2 The marginal eﬀect is for a discrete change in the variable X. Standard deviations are given in
parentheses.
3 The eﬀect of low caste is obtained by using a Probit speciﬁcation, controlling for job vacancy
level random eﬀects. Controls for applicant gender and job type are included.
4 ∗ Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level,∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level,∗∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 2.5 percent,∗∗∗∗
Signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
Although caste in insigniﬁcant in explaining callback in the overall sample there is
heterogeneity in callback gaps across the diﬀerent kinds of ﬁrms. Given that ﬁrms without
multiple domestic oﬃces and foreign oﬃces have a smaller scale of operations it may
be argued that among ﬁrms with a small scale of operations caste continues to play
an important role in setting the low-caste applicant at a disadvantage in comparison
to a high-caste applicant. The results for ﬁrms with larger scale of operations (multiple
domestic oﬃces and foreign oﬃces) are not too surprising. In response to the government’s
perceived support for introduction of quotas for low-caste workers in private sector jobs,
many large ﬁrms recently committed themselves to recruit more actively from among low-
caste workers. The reason that the main job search web site used (Naukri) introduced
24the feature allowing applicants to declare their caste status was precisely because they
expected caste status to be beneﬁcial to applicants given the commitments made. The
results from the study indicate that although low-caste applicants are more actively
sought by ﬁrms which have a larger scale of operations this is not the case for ﬁrms with
a smaller scale of operations. Low-caste applicants still face a serious disadvantage in
callback when facing these ﬁrms. These results also follow naturally from taste-based
theories of discrimination. These theories argue that non-discriminating ﬁrms do not
incur the costs associated with hiring less productive workers from preferred groups and
such ﬁrms should be making higher proﬁts and growing faster than non-discriminating
ﬁrms. For this interpretation, ﬁrm size is a consequence of ﬁrm practices (discriminate
or not) rather than the other way around. Either or both of these interpretations would
be consistent with the evidence.
E. Average Treatment Eﬀects
An important ﬁnding of the paper, that the gap in callback between high and low-caste
applicants is higher in some sub populations than in others, also holds when looking at
the average treatment eﬀect across the population and in the diﬀerent sub populations.
Let the outcome be the callback probability which takes the value Y (1) among high-caste
applicants and the value Y (0) among low-caste applicants. Then the average treatment
eﬀect is given by ATE = E[Y (1) − Y (0)]. Given the randomization carried out during
the ﬁeld experiment, the ATE simpliﬁes considerably to ATE = E[Y |High Caste] −
E[Y |Low Caste]. The average treatment eﬀect may be found simply by comparing the
sample averages and a conﬁdence interval constructed around the treatment eﬀects by
using the bootstrap. I use 200 bootstrap replications to ﬁnd the 90 percent conﬁdence
intervals around the Average Treatment Eﬀects. In addition I also ﬁnd the 90 percent
conﬁdence intervals around the Average Treatment Eﬀects for speciﬁc sub-populations.
These conﬁdence intervals are given in table 11.
The average treatment eﬀect for the entire population is 0.02. This is the expected dif-
ference in callback probability between all applicants being high-caste and all applicants
25Table 11: Average treatment eﬀect on callback
Average treatment eﬀect 90% conﬁdence interval
Entire Population 0.02 [0.0000,0.0535]
Male Recruiters 0.05 [0.0000,0.0904]
Female Recruiters −0.01 [−0.0548,0.0440]
Hindu Recruiters 0.03 [−0.0038,0.0673]
Non-Hindu Recruiters −0.05 [−0.1190,0.0172]
Firms with MDO −0.01 [−0.0526,0.0301]
Firms without MDO 0.06 [0.0000,0.1220]
Firms with FO −0.04 [−0.0851,0.0267]
Firms without FO 0.06 [0.0148,0.1095]
1 MDO is Multiple Domestic Oﬃces, FO Foreign Oﬃces.
2 Average treatment eﬀect is E[y(1)−y(0)] where y(1) is callback for high-caste resumes
and y(0) is callback for low-caste applicants.
3 Conﬁdence intervals are constructed by using 200 bootstrap replications.
being low-caste. For the population, high-caste applicants have higher callback than do
low-caste applicants. The average treatment eﬀects for the diﬀerent sub populations of
recruiters and ﬁrms also give interesting results. The average treatment eﬀect is positive
for male recruiters and for Hindu recruiters. It is 0.05 for male recruiters and 0.03 for
Hindu recruiters, higher than it is in the overall population. The average treatment ef-
fect is negative for female recruiters and for non-Hindu recruiters. It is −0.01 for female
recruiters and −0.05 for non-Hindu recruiters. For these groups, the average diﬀerence
in callback favors low-caste applicants over high-caste applicants. The conﬁdence inter-
vals on the average treatment eﬀects take into account the sampling variation. These
conﬁdence intervals, although they contain zero, are still fairly informative, being skewed
positively for both male and Hindu recruiters. The average treatment eﬀects across dif-
ferent ﬁrms are also given in the table. For ﬁrms without multiple domestic oﬃces or
without foreign oﬃces, the average treatment eﬀects are positive and larger than for the
overall population, at 0.06. For ﬁrms without foreign oﬃces the conﬁdence interval also
does not include zero and is entirely positive. For ﬁrms with multiple domestic oﬃces
and with foreign oﬃces, the average treatment eﬀect is negative, being −0.01 for ﬁrms
with multiple domestic oﬃces and −0.04 for ﬁrms with a foreign oﬃce, indicating that
callback is higher for low-caste applicants than it is for high-caste applicants when they
26are facing these ﬁrms.
IV. Discussion
The results from this audit study indicate that there are more ﬁrms which favor high-
caste applicants over low-caste applicants rather than the other way around. There
is considerable heterogeneity found in the callback gap by caste when information on
recruiter and ﬁrm characteristics is incorporated in the analysis.
A. Taste Based vs. Statistical Discrimination
How does the data collected during the audit study relate to the theoretical literature
on labor market discrimination? The study of discrimination within the labor economics
literature goes back to the early 1960s when Becker[7] ﬁrst described such discrimination
as a result of prejudice or taste. The employer was modeled as willing to forego some
money income in order to avoid associating with people of a certain race in comparison
to others. Alternatively, employees or consumers might be willing to forego some money
income in order to avoid associating with people of a certain race in comparison to oth-
ers. The resulting disparity in outcomes which results from this prejudice is referred to
as employer, employee, or consumer discrimination. An unattractive feature of the early
taste based model of discrimination as discussed by Becker[7] and others was that it failed
to explain the persistence of discriminating ﬁrms in the long run, since such ﬁrms should
be making lower proﬁts than would competitive non-discriminating ﬁrms. Later models
either introduced search frictions into the taste-based models or modeled discrimination
as an information problem.13 The latter class of models, referred to as models of sta-
tistical discrimination, assumes that ﬁrms have incomplete information about the actual
productivity of a worker when the hiring decision is being made so they use either racial
stereotypes14 or signals which might be more informative about some racial groups as
13See Phelps 1972[35] for an early example. In Foster and Vohra 1992[14] group disparities arise as a
result of co-ordination failure.
14Coate and Loury 1993[10] and Moro and Norman 2004[30] which extends the Coate and Loury[10]
framework to endogenize the wage rate and carry out general equilibrium analysis.
27compared to others.15 Groups of prospective workers which have identical productivity
ex-ante may turn out to have diﬀerent productivity levels ex-post due to the informa-
tion problem and diﬀering incentives for workers in diﬀerent groups to invest in human
capital. It seems plausible to conclude that both types of discrimination– taste based
and statistical– may be present in the labor market although empirical researchers have
found it diﬃcult to disentangle the two.
All the productivity correlates which are observable and which get used by the ﬁrm in
making the callback decision are contained in the resumes which are sent in response to
the job vacancy advertisements. I can therefore rule out as a cause of diﬀerential callback
any diﬀerences in observable productivity between high and low-caste applicants, since
all the resumes which were used had the same level of observable productivity. How-
ever, it is possible that the hiring ﬁrm infers more from the resumes than observable
productivity. Suppose for instance ﬁrms associate high-caste names with good primary
education and better English accents for jobs in customer service. In this case the diﬀer-
ential callback could be due to diﬀerences in unobservable productivity which I cannot
observe in the study. This is an example of statistical discrimination. In other words,
diﬀerential callback observed in the study could arise not just as a result of prejudice of
hiring ﬁrms against low-caste applicants, but it may also arise as a result of diﬀerences in
unobservable productivity across the diﬀerent groups of applicants. Therefore the audit
study method is unable to distinguish between taste-based discrimination and statistical
discrimination explicitly. However, the results that are observed from the study in this
paper make it likely that at least some of the callback gap is due to employer prejudice.
One would expect rational and informed recruiters to statistically discriminate against
low-caste applicants if they believed that the expected productivity of low-caste appli-
cants was less than the expected productivity of high-caste applicants. However, the
randomization in the audit study implies that expected productivity should not depend
on the background of the recruiter, thus the callback gap should not vary across recruiter
background. Therefore the variation in callback gap across recruiter background that I
15Aigner and Cain 1977[1], Lundberg and Startz 1983[25] and 1991[26].
28ﬁnd has to be coming, at least partly, from prejudice and not diﬀerences in expected pro-
ductivity (statistical discrimination). This reasoning assumes that recruiter background
is not related to the type of skills demanded by the job vacancy.16
Suppose X is the set of productivity correlates used by the recruiter in making the
callback decision and that X = {Xo,Xu}. Also assume that Xo are productivity at-
tributes unobservable to both the employer and the researcher and Xu are productivity
attributes which are observable to both the employer and the researcher. Assume further
that X is additively separable in Xo and Xu, then
E[X|Xo,High Caste] = Xo + E[Xu|Xo,High Caste]
and
E[X|Xo,Low Caste] = Xo + E[Xu|Xo,Low Caste]
since observable productivity is constant and known for all applicants by the nature
of the audit study design. Then it is also true that
E[X|Xo,High Caste] − E[X|Xo,Low Caste] =
E[Xu|Xo,High Caste]−E[Xu|Xo,Low Caste]
Assume for simplicity there are two groups of recruiters, R = {m,f}. Given the
presence of statistical discrimination, there is a population expectation of unobservable
productivity and all rational recruiters are aware of this expectation (or at least form
expectations the same way). Then
E[Xu|Xo,High Caste,R = m] = E[Xu|Xo,High Caste,R = f]
and
16See Anwar and Fang (2004)[4] for development of statistical tests which test for whether troopers of
diﬀerent races are monolithic in their search behavior and whether they exhibit relative racial prejudice.
One problem when testing for statistical discrimination in labor markets instead of mortgage lending
or racial proﬁling (as in Anwar and Fang (2004)[4]) is that the outcome of interest, actual worker
productivity, is not available. Therefore the tests from Anwar and Fang (2004)[4] cannot be applied in
this context.
29E[Xu|Xo,Low Caste,R = m] = E[Xu|Xo,Low Caste,R = f]
Given this assumption,
E[Xu|Xo,High Caste,R = m] − E[Xu|Xo,Low Caste,R = m] =
E[Xu|Xo,High Caste,R = f] − E[Xu|Xo,Low Caste,R = f]
or
E[X|Xo,High Caste,R = m] − E[X|Xo,Low Caste,R = m] =
E[X|Xo,High Caste,R = f] − E[X|Xo,Low Caste,R = f]
So if there is no prejudice the callback gap should be the same for both groups of
recruiters. This is not the case, implying there is some prejudice present. There are some
important caveats concerning the above argument; it assumes implicitly that recruiter
background is not related to the type of skills required by the job. For instance higher
callback gaps for male recruiters would be observed if male recruiters carry out more
recruiting in jobs for which unobserved components of productivity are more important.
However this is not true for the sample of jobs in my sample. The distribution of recruiter
background among the kinds of jobs is fairly similar: 63 percent of the male recruiters
and 62 percent of the female recruiters in the sample were recruiting for jobs in customer
services. This is in comparison to 64 percent of the job vacancies in customer services for
the entire sample of recruiters in the data set and 63 percent of jobs in customer services
for the sub-sample for which recruiter characteristics were available. As regards recruiter
religion, 63 percent of the Hindu recruiters were recruiting for jobs in customer services
while 61 percent of the non-Hindu recruiters were recruiting for such jobs.
The heterogeneity in the callback gaps across diﬀerent kinds of ﬁrms also follows
naturally from taste-based theories of discrimination, although one cannot rule this out
as being the result of information asymmetries. According to taste-based theories of
discrimination, non-discriminating ﬁrms make higher proﬁts than discriminating ﬁrms
since they do not incur the costs of hiring high-caste workers of low productivity. Since
they make higher proﬁts they also grow faster than discriminating ﬁrms. Therefore
30non-discriminating ﬁrms are larger than discriminating ﬁrms as a result of their non-
discriminatory practices.
B. Policy Implications
What are the implications of the present study on policy? The study described in this
paper can help inform somewhat policy analysis regarding aﬃrmative action but it gives
no deﬁnitive evidence one way or the other. The question that this paper can help with is
whether large-scale discrimination exists in the private sector, since this would strengthen
the case for the introduction of aﬃrmative action.
The main result of the audit carried out in Chennai was that, in the overall sample
of hiring ﬁrms, low-caste applicants had lower callback than did high-caste applicants,
but the diﬀerences in callback were not statistically signiﬁcant. However the magnitude
of the diﬀerence in callback for applicants of diﬀerent castes is non-trivial. If an average
applicant gets one job after interviewing at ten diﬀerent places, then a high-caste applicant
will need to send her resume to 62 diﬀerent job vacancies to get a job while a low-caste
applicant will need to send her resume for 74 diﬀerent job vacancies to get a job. This
assumes that there is no discrimination at the interview stage of the hiring process, an
assumption which need not hold in the real world. It is ﬁnancially costless for the low-
caste applicant to send an additional ten resumes using the job web site, but there are
costs associated with a longer wait time while new vacancies become available and these
costs are likely to be higher the fewer the alternatives to job web sites in searching for a
white collar job. While carrying out the study, ten months were required to ﬁnd a little
more than ﬁve hundred vacancies in customer service and front oﬃce/administration for
entry level positions by distinctive ﬁrms. This suggests that to get one callback, the
low-caste applicant has to wait a little more than half a day compared to a high-caste
applicant, if both are applying only for entry level jobs in customer service and never apply
to the same ﬁrm twice. When applying for entry level jobs in front oﬃce/administration,
the low-caste applicant has to wait for ﬁve-and-a-half days more to get one callback
compared to a high-caste applicant, if both never apply to the same ﬁrm twice.
31Another important result from the study was the heterogeneity in the callback gap
across recruiter and ﬁrm characteristics. The heterogeneity across recruiter characteristics
indicates the presence of prejudice, and heterogeneity across ﬁrm characteristics suggests
that although ﬁrms with a larger scale of operations seek out low-caste workers, this is
not the case for ﬁrms with a smaller scale of operations. Low-caste applicants still face a
signiﬁcant disadvantage when applying for jobs at ﬁrms with a smaller scale of operations.
The presence of discrimination in hiring would lead low-caste workers to invest less
in their human capital skills than they otherwise would. A caste-based quota in hiring
would lead to a larger number of low-caste workers being hired and reduce the inequality
they face in hiring. This would also improve their incentives to make human capital
investments.17 Given the disparities in human capital between the diﬀerent caste groups,
a caste-based quota is a relatively costless policy (for the government but not for the
society) which might lead to a more equitable outcome. It might also be justiﬁable
given that low-caste applicants face some disadvantage in the private sector. However,
at the same time it would be premature to unequivocally support caste-based quotas.
The collection of more and larger of such data sets would be an important prelude to
providing a context for the design of the best policy for the welfare of low-caste workers.
V. Conclusion
The resume-based audit study reveals that low-caste applicants receive lower callback
than high-caste applicants irrespective of job type (customer service or front oﬃce/admin)
or gender (female applicant or male applicant). Low-caste reduces callback more for
jobs in front oﬃce/administration than it does for jobs in customer services. Low-caste
also reduces callback more for female applicants than for male applicants. The eﬀect
of low-caste for female applicants who applied for jobs in front oﬃce/administration is
signiﬁcantly negative.
17It should be noted that the theoretical literature on discrimination provides us with ambiguous
results on the eﬀects of aﬃrmative action policy. In Coate and Loury (1993)[10] and Moro and Norman
(2003)[29] aﬃrmative action may lead to patronizing equilibria in which discriminated groups ﬁnd it
easier to get jobs in high skill sectors and this leads them to invest less in their human capital rather
than more.
32Incorporation of recruiter and ﬁrm characteristics into the analysis reveals substantial
heterogeneities in callback gaps across these characteristics. I ﬁnd that the eﬀect of low-
caste on callback is negative for resumes sent to male recruiters and to Hindu recruiters
but that the eﬀect of low-caste on callback is positive for resumes sent to female recruiters
and to non-Hindu recruiters. The eﬀect of low-caste on callback is negative for resumes
sent to ﬁrms that have a smaller scale of operations (absence of multiple domestic oﬃces
or any foreign oﬃces) but the eﬀect of low-caste on callback is positive for resumes sent to
ﬁrms that have a larger scale of operations (presence of multiple domestic oﬃces or foreign
oﬃces). The variation of the eﬀect of low-caste on callback across the diﬀerent recruiter
characteristics indicates that at least some of the discrimination observed in favor of the
high-caste applicants is taste based rather the result of information asymmetries. The
variation of the eﬀect of low-caste on callback across the diﬀerent ﬁrm characteristics is
important since it indicates that low-caste signiﬁcantly disadvantages the applicant when
applying for jobs with ﬁrms who have a smaller scale of operations. This variation is
consistent with taste-based theories of discrimination and also with commitments made
by large ﬁrms to recruit more actively from amongst low-caste groups. The heterogeneities
in callback across diﬀerent groups of recruiters and ﬁrms may also be seen by looking
at the average treatment eﬀects across the diﬀerent sub-populations of recruiters and
ﬁrms. The average treatment eﬀects support the earlier analysis carried out by using
multivariate regressions.
Given the results from the audit study, is there a case to be made for the introduction
of caste-based aﬃrmative action quotas in private sector jobs? I ﬁnd that there is strong
evidence of discrimination among particular groups of recruiters and ﬁrms. A caste-based
quota would potentially force all recruiters and ﬁrms to hire more low-caste workers.
Therefore the results of this study provide some support for the introduction of hiring
quotas by caste in the private sector. However, more and larger studies need to be carried
out before more deﬁnite policy recommendations may be made.
Another important issue concerning the study is that of external validity: how far
can the results of the study be generalized to other labor market settings within India?
33The study was carried out for white collar jobs in the city of Chennai. It is not clear
whether the patterns observed in Chennai are the same as would be found in other large
urban areas of India. The inter-caste dynamics vary in the diﬀerent areas of the country,
although it would be fair to generalize the results from Chennai to other large urban
areas in the South of the country (such as, for instance, Bangalore and Hyderabad) in
which most of the new white collar jobs of the country are located. Also, the study was
carried out for entry-level jobs in speciﬁc white-collar professions. It is not clear whether
the same patterns would be observed in white-collar jobs that require higher skills (for
instance jobs in IT) or in the blue collar professions. For white-collar jobs that require
higher skills, caste may play an important role. Professional occupations are heavily
dominated by high-caste groups within India. Although the white-collar jobs in this
study requiring greater skills (such as for instance in IT, ﬁnance and human resources)
were dropped from the analysis due to high non-response, the few observations which
were obtained indicated even larger gaps in callback in favor of high-caste applicants.
As regards blue collar professions in India, it has been noted in the past that networks
play a very important role in these professions.18 Hiring is done in very diﬀerent ways
within the blue-collar professions in comparison to the kind of hiring which is the subject
of the audit in this paper. It is possible that low-caste actually provides advantages to
applicants in certain blue collar professions. This would be the case, for instance, if a
particular low-caste group dominates a blue collar profession and has strong networks in
that profession.
The audit study as a tool to measure discrimination has gained more importance
recently. In particular, the use of resume-based audits is now recognized by economists
as an innovative technique to gather clean and reliable evidence of discrimination in
diﬀerent labor market settings. It has proved to be useful in order to study more carefully
employer’s hiring decisions on which there exists little data. Variations on the resume-
based audit methods may be used to gather information on how employers make hiring
decisions when faced with applicants who vary across diﬀerent dimensions. In the present
18Munshi and Rozensweig[32].
34context of caste-based discrimination, it gives us important insights on actual decision
making of employers when they face high and low caste applicants.
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38Appendix 1: Symmetry Tests
In order to test symmetry between high and low-caste applicants two diﬀerent tests were
used. These were the likelihood ratio test and the conditional sign test. The likelihood
ratio test uses the chi square statistic to test the null hypothesis of symmetry between
high and low-caste applicants. The null hypothesis being tested is that the probability
that a high-caste applicant is called back and a low-caste applicant is not is the same as
the probability that a low-caste applicant is called back and a high-caste applicant is not.
The alternative to the likelihood ratio test is the conditional sign test, which is an exact
test more suited to small samples. The test conditions on the event that just one of the
two applicants gets called back. In order to test the performance of the two symmetry
tests, a Monte Carlo exercise is undertaken in this appendix to check the size and power
of the two tests. The results of the exercise are given in the following paragraphs and
ﬁgures. It was found that the two tests give fairly similar results in samples the same
size as the one used in the paper.
In the ﬁrst set of simulations the data-generation process is multinomial with the
probability of the diﬀerent events being the following: Probability (high-caste Callback,
low-caste Callback)= f(x,y) = (0,0) = 0.79,f(x,y) = (0,1) = 0.07,f(x,y) = (1,0) =
0.07,f(x,y) = (1,1) = 0.07. The sample size is 523 and the sign test statistic and likeli-
hood ratio statistics estimated from 10,000 simulations. The results from the simulations
are given in the Figure below.
In the second set of simulations the data generation process is again multinomial but
with the probability of the diﬀerent events being the following: Probability (high-caste
Callback, low-caste Callback) = f(x,y) = (0,0) = 0.75,f(x,y) = (0,1) = 0.05,f(x,y) =
(1,0) = 0.10,f(x,y) = (1,1) = 0.10. The sample size is 523 and the sign test statistic
and likelihood ratio statistics estimated from 10,000 simulations. The results from the
simulations are given in the Figure below.
39Figure 5: Monte Carlo Simulation, f(0,1) = f(1,0) = 0.07
Figure 6: Monte Carlo Simulation f(0,1) = 0.05,f(1,0) = 0.10
40Appendix 2: Fisher Exact Test
To test whether diﬀerences in callback gaps between high and low-caste workers are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across job types and gender pairs or across recruiters and ﬁrms,
Fisher’s Exact test is performed on the data. In general the test is used to determine the
signiﬁcance of the association between two categorical variables. With large samples a
chi-square test can be performed to determine this signiﬁcance level but for small sample
sizes (as the ones in this paper) the Fisher test is used since the chi-square approximation
is inappropriate.
Suppose the two variables are X and Y , with X taking on m diﬀerent values and Y
taking on n diﬀerent values. Let αij be the number of observations in which m = i and
n = j in an m×n matrix. Let the row and column sums be Ri and Cj and let N be the
total sum of the matrix. Then the conditional probability of getting the actual matrix






which is a multivariate version of the hypergeometric distribution. In order to ob-
tain the p-value from the Fisher test all possible matrices consistent with the row and
column totals are constructed and their conditional probabilities estimated. Conditional
probabilities of all matrices which exhibit equal or greater independence than the original
matrix are then added together to get the p-value. Independence may be measured using
either the Pearson chi-square or diﬀerences in proportions. In the paper the p-values ob-
tained considered matrices as exhibiting equal or greater independence if the conditional
probability of obtaining them was less than or equal to the conditional probability of
getting the actual matrix.
41Appendix 3: Secondary Data Sources
There are a number of secondary data sources used in the paper which outline the status
of low-caste applicants vis a vis high-caste applicants as well as ﬁrm level activity in the
region of Chennai. This appendix gives a brief background on these data sources, the
methods used in their collection, the actual data contained in these data sets and their
uses. In the absence of Census level data on Caste19 these data sets are an important
source of information regarding the status of the diﬀerent caste groups in the country.
National Sample Survey
The National Sample Survey (NSS) is a nation wide, quinquennial survey on employment
and unemployment conducted by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) of
the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation of the Government of India. The
data used in the paper is taken from publicly available reports20 using the most recent
and seventh survey. This is the 61st round of the National Sample Survey conducted
between July 2004 and June 2005.
The ﬁrst quinquennial survey on employment and unemployment was carried out by
the NSSO between September 1972 and October 1973 (the 27th round). Since then six
more such surveys have been undertaken by the NSSO. The 61st round survey covers
the whole of Indian Union except Leh and Kargil districts of Jammu and Kashmir, the
interior villages in Nagaland and inaccessible villages in Andaman and Nicobar islands.
The entire survey period of twelve months was divided into four sub-rounds of three
months each with an equal number of sample villages/blocks allotted in each of the four
sub-rounds. The survey was conducted in the form of face to face interviews and the
sample chosen by stratiﬁed multistage sampling.
In the multistage sampling, the ﬁrst stage units were the census villages for the rural
areas and the NSSO urban frame blocks for urban areas. The ﬁnal stage units were
households for both urban and rural areas. Hamlet groups/sub-blocks formed the inter-
19Since 1941 the collection of individual data on caste was discontinued in the Census (except for
aﬃliation with the SC and ST categories).
20The reports are available online at
42mediate stage whenever these were found in the sampled ﬁrst stage units. Of a total of
12,788 ﬁrst stage units selected (8128 villages and 4660 urban blocks) 12,601 ﬁrst stage
units ended up being included in the survey. The ﬁnal sample included 7,999 villages and
4,602 urban blocks covering 124,680 households and enumerating 602,833 individuals.
The survey includes detailed information on employment and caste category which, in
the publicly available aggregate form, provides a rich source of descriptive data.
National Election Study
The National Election Study (NES), 2004 is a post election survey in India conducted
by the Center for Studies in Developing Economies (CSDS). The study is comparable
to the National Election Studies conducted in the US and Britain. The single wave of
the post poll survey of 2004 was carried out in all twenty eight states of the Indian
Union as well as the three Union territories. The main objective of the survey was to
determine the behavior and opinions of Indian voters and to explain electoral outcomes.
The background information collected by the survey included self-reported data on caste
category and jati which has been used in the paper to examine the breakdown by caste
group for diﬀerent occupations (see Figure 8).
The ﬁrst such surveys were conducted by the CSDS during the 1970s. No survey
was then conducted till the mid 1990s. In 1996 three waves of surveys (pre election, mid
campaign and post poll) were conducted on a panel of respondents selected by multistage
stratiﬁed random sampling. The same panel of respondents was used in 1998 for two
waves of pre election and post poll surveys. In 1999 again the same panel formed the
sample of a post poll survey. The survey carried out in 2004 is the fourth general election
for which the survey has been conducted in a row. It has a substantially larger sample
of respondents than did the previous surveys and more state level variables.
The sample for the NES, 2004 survey was collected by using a four stage stratiﬁed
random sampling design. In ﬁrst stage 420 of the 543 parliamentary constituencies were
sampled. In the second stage sampling of assembly contituencies within the parliamentary
constituencies was done to get a set of 932 assembly constituencies. In the third stage
43sampling of polling station areas within the assembly constituencies was carried out by
using systematic random sampling to get a set of 2,380 polling station areas. Finally
respondents were drawn randomly from the electoral rolls of the selected polling station
areas which provided a target of 35,360 names. Of these face to face interviews were
conducted for 76.9 percent, to get a sample size of 27,189 respondents. The numbers
of variables on which data was collected were 160. In comparison to oﬃcial data the
sample which was eventually used had a slight over representation of men, signiﬁcant
over representation of rural areas, slight under representation of Muslims, and slight over
representation of SC.
44